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Abstract   
Achieving high compliance rates in incentive-based agri-environmental schemes is an 
important issue. This paper explores the use of a mixed penalty-reward approach under 
heterogeneous compliance costs. Specifically, we examine the use of a “compliance 
reward” under asymmetric information and output price uncertainty. Using a 
budget-neutral approach, three possible sources of financing are considered: 1. funds 
obtained by reducing monitoring effort; 2. the proceeds of fines collected from 
participating farmers who are inspected and found not to be in compliance; and 3. 
money saved by reducing the number of farmers enrolled. We discuss the advantages 
and disadvantages of each source of funding and analyze them numerically for both 
risk-neutral and risk-averse farmers. We show that under certain conditions a mixed 
penalty-reward system can increase the likelihood of compliance without increasing 
programme costs. For risk-averse farmers, however, conditions that ensure a positive 
outcome from compliance rewards become more restrictive. The implications of these 
findings are outlined for the future design of agri-environmental schemes with 
reference to cost-share working lands programmes such as EQIP in the United States. 
Keywords: Agri-environmental policy, moral hazard, penalties, payments for 
compliance 
JEL codes Q12 Q20 Q28 Q57 
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1.  Introduction 
Agri-environmental schemes are receiving increasing attention as a means of 
enhancing the supply of environmental public goods or reducing negative externalities 
associated with agricultural activities. Many schemes offer incentive payments to 
encourage farmers to adopt environmentally-friendly farming methods. In the United 
States, the National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and the Farm Service 
Agency (FSA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture manage voluntary 
agri-environmental programmes (conservation programmes) such as the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP), the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), and 
the Conservation Security Program (CSP). Although the focus in the United States was 
originally on taking environmentally-sensitive land out of production, emphasis has 
been broadened to working-land programmes, in which payments are made to farmers 
to adopt production practices that improve water and air quality, and protect wildlife 
habitat. Agri-environmental schemes that involve these broader objectives are 
increasingly popular in many other countries, for example, the Environmentally 
Sensitive Areas Scheme (ESAS) and the Countryside Stewardship Scheme (CSS) in 
the United Kingdom. 
Asymmetric information poses a challenge in the design of incentive-based 
agri-environmental schemes. The difficulty originates from the fact that the 
agri-environmental agency does not have accurate information on farmers’ 
characteristics (raising the issue of adverse selection) and/or can only observe their 
actions imperfectly after a contract is signed (raising the issue of moral hazard
2). 
Adverse selection arises when low-cost farmers have an incentive to disguise 
themselves as high-cost farmers in order to obtain higher payments under a scheme. 
This can result in overcompensation, lower environmental benefits and reduced cost 
effectiveness. Moral hazard arises if some farmers receive payments without fulfilling 
their contractual obligations. In summary, information asymmetry is likely to result in 
reduced outcomes and it is important to address the issue in designing 
agri-environmental programmes. 
Many authors that have addressed information asymmetry have focused on 
adverse selection (Spubler 1988; Chambers 1992; Bourgeon et al. 1995; Wu and 
                                                
2  In general, continuous actions, such as the amount of manure applied to farmland, are harder to 
monitor than discrete actions, such as the installation of equipment to handle animal waste. However, 
lack of maintenance or improper use of such equipment can also result in low environmental 
performance.   3   
 
Babcock 1996; Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997; Moxey et al. 1999). 
Choe and Fraser (1999) observe that far less attention has been devoted to the problem 
of moral hazard and compliance monitoring
3. Ozanne et al. (2001) and Fraser (2002)
4 
examine the likelihood of compliance and conclude that risk aversion among farmers 
can diminish the moral hazard problem in agri-environmental programmes
5. Hart and 
Latacz-Lohmann (2005) investigate the implications of variations in compliance costs, 
assuming a uniform distribution. The role of penalties has been considered in the 
literature, but for political reasons, the actual use of penalties in agri-environmental 
programs is often limited and the inspection rate may be low. 
One possibility for increasing the effectiveness of environmental schemes is to 
use “compliance rewards”, i.e., payments made to farmers who, when inspected, are 
found to be in compliance with the terms of a scheme. Although not currently applied 
in the agricultural area, this approach is being advocated by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) through its National Environmental Performance Track 
Program
6. A limited amount of economic analysis exists on the effect of this type of 
pecuniary reward. Falkinger and Walther (1991) use a detailed theoretical model to 
investigate the role of compliance rewards, focusing on tax compliance behaviour. 
Other recent papers (e.g., Alm et al., 1992; Torgler, 2003) use an experimental 
approach in laboratory experiments. Feld et al. (2006) discuss the impact of 
compliance rewards in the context of self-declared taxation obligations and provide a 
design mechanism for field experiments. 
In this paper we build upon the work of Fraser and Hart et al. to examine the 
effect of introducing compliance rewards on compliance rates in agri-environmental 
programmes, focusing on the model used in working land payment programmes such 
as EQIP. That programme provides an initial cost-share payment to farmers who agree 
                                                
3  Cohen (1999) also points out that enforcement and monitoring have received far less attention than 
other issues in the general environmental economics literature. 
4  Fraser includes output price uncertainty in his model. He also shows that the likelihood of compliance 
can be increased by changing inversely penalties and the probability of detection, keeping the expected 
penalty unchanged. 
5  Stranlund, J.K. (2006) analyzes the effects of risk aversion on compliance choice in markets for 
pollution control. Yano and Blandford (2008) consider simultaneous output price and production 
uncertainty and examine the impact of risk aversion among farmers on the likelihood of compliance. 
They find that if a conservation practice has a risk increasing effect, moral hazard is more problematic. 
6  Under the National Environmental Performance Track Program (NEPTP), EPA pays rewards to firms 
that achieve or exceed minimum regulatory requirements and use additional measures to improve 
environmental performance.   4   
 
to adopt environmentally-friendly production practices
7. Using a budget-neutral 
approach
8  we consider three possible sources of financing for rewards: 1. funds 
obtained by reducing the inspection rate (monitoring expenditures); 2. use of the 
proceeds from fines imposed on farmers who violate contractual obligations; and 3. 
money saved by reducing the number of farmers enrolled in the programme (total 
initial cost-share payments). The advantages and disadvantages of each source are 
examined theoretically and numerically for both risk-neutral and risk-averse farmers. 
In addition, we investigate the conditions that determine the preferred choice between 
monitoring effort and compliance rewards when budgetary savings or additional 
budgetary resources are available. 
Our results suggest that under certain conditions, the introduction of compliance 
rewards can increase compliance rates for both risk-neutral and risk-averse farmers. 
We conclude that if the cost of monitoring per farmer is quite high, reducing 
monitoring effort to fund compliance rewards is effective. However, a relatively large 
reduction in the probability of inspection will result in lower compliance rates among 
risk-averse farmers. Proceeds from fines can also be used in conjunction with that 
approach if non-compliance rates are initially high. Money saved by reducing 
programme enrolment should be used only when the agri-environmental agency is able 
to estimate each farmer’s potential contribution to environmental quality, as in the case 
under some U.S. programmes
9. Additionally, if extra budgetary resources are made 
available, the compliance reward is a preferred instrument if monitoring costs per 
farmer are high. 
  In the next section we develop a basic model for compliance monitoring in the 
context of cost sharing. In section 3 we develop a theoretical model to examine the role 
of compliance rewards in agri-environmental schemes, and discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of each source of funding. Section 4 presents the results of numerical 
analysis using the Monte Carlo method to illustrate the main findings in sections 2 and 
3. The final section of the paper presents our conclusions and their implications for the 
                                                
7  Lump sum incentive payments are also associated with EQIP but we focus on its cost sharing aspects 
in this paper. 
8  The environmental agency may be able to increase its budget, but since the issue is frequently one of 
deciding how to allocate existing financial resources, our primary focus is on a budget-neutral approach 
to funding compliance rewards. We assume that the environmental agency seeks to allocate funds 
optimally to maximize environmental performance subject to its budget constraint. 
9  For example, the NRCS uses an “offer index” to estimate farmers’ potential contribution to 
environmental quality in EQIP.   5   
 
design and implementation of agri-environmental policies in the United States and 
other countries. 
2.  The Basic Model of Compliance Monitoring under Cost Sharing 
We begin with a cost sharing model. There is a working lands programme providing a 
pre-specified cost share payment to farmers for the adoption of specific production 
practices, as is the case under the EQIP programme in the United States. Each farmer 
can take one of two decisions: non-participation or participation. It is assumed that the 
cost share rate, ) 1 , 0 ( Î g , is based on expected compliance costs (fixed and variable) 
that are unrelated to production, denoted by
e I . For ease of exposition we use the term 
“direct” compliance costs for such costs in the remainder of the paper. In addition, we 
assume that implementing required practices reduces the level of output. Since a cost 
share payment does not cover these costs completely, we assume that there are 
expected (monetary) compliance benefits,
e B , to farmers from adopting the proposed 
conservation practice. Denoting the expected profit foregone by
e F , a farmer chooses 
to participate in the programme if 0 ) 1 ( > F - - -
e e e I B g . Note that if the expected 
compliance benefit exceeds the expected direct compliance cost plus expected profit 
foregone, the agri-environmental agency does not have to provide a cost share payment 
to induce a farmer to enter the scheme. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that
e e e I B F + < , that is, cost sharing is an incentive for participation (not for 
compliance). 
  Again, following the design of the EQIP programme, after a contract is signed, 
the farmer faces three possible choices: 1) contract withdrawal
10: the farmer cancels 
the contract; 2) compliance: the farmer abides by terms of the contract; and 3) 
non-compliance (cheating): the farmer takes the cost share payment, but does not fulfil 
the contractual obligations. Now let
a I ,
a B , and 
a F   denote the actual compliance 
cost (ex post), actual private benefits from compliance, and profit foregone, 
respectively. We assume that there is uncertainty in profit due to random output price 
variation. If 0 ) 1 ( < F - - -
a a a I B g , and there is no penalty for cancellation, the 
farmer chooses contract withdrawal.   
                                                
10  The contract withdrawal phenomenon in the EQIP programme is examined by Cattaneo (2003) using 
a logit model.     6   
 
Let us focus on N participating farmers adopting an identical practice. Assuming 
that the expected direct compliance cost and the cost share rate is the same for all 
farmers, the i
th farmer’s expected payoff







i p y c p I I B E ~ ) ( - + + - = g p                                         (1) 
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e nc
i p y c p I E ) ( - + = g p                                                       (2) 
where  p   is expected output price,  i c   is unit cost of output, and  i y   represents the 
level of output that the i
th farmer produces  i i y y ~ >   for all  N i ,..., 1 = . The 
superscripts c and nc indicate compliance and non-compliance respectively.  p E   is the 
expectation operator defined over p , which has a cumulative distribution function, 
] 1 , 0 [ : ® Â Q . 
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i I B F + <   is high. In that 
case the i
th farmer will choose not to comply with terms of the contract. 
We now introduce the probability of inspection and penalties into our model. We 
assume that the (objective) probability of inspection determined by the 
agri-environmental agency is known with certainty by all farmers and independent of 
farmers’ previous behaviour (i.e., there is state-independent auditing)
12  and 
independent of output price. Monitoring is assumed to be perfect in the sense that once 
a participating farmer is inspected, any violation of the terms of the contract will be 
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F y c p I E i i
e nc
i q g p - - + = ) (                                             (4) 
where  ] 1 , 0 ( Î q   represents the objective probability of inspection and  F   is the size 
of penalty for non-compliance, which is assumed to be greater than the initial cost 
share payment.  E   is the expectation operator defined over  p   and  q . The 
risk-neutral farmer selects compliance if: 
                                                 
11  Fixed (production) cost is not included, but does not affect farmers’ compliance behaviour. 
12  Harrington (1988), Friesen (2003), and Fraser (2004) investigate state-dependent monitoring 
schemes using a dynamic game model which can provide cost savings for an agri-environmental agency. 
This aspect is not discussed in this paper.   7   
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This means that if the expected penalty is greater than net total compliance cost, the 






i i B I - F + = G   is distributed according to the distribution function  ) (G g   with 
associated cumulative ) (G G , then the compliance rate will be ) ( F G q = W . An increase 
in the expected penalty results in an increase in the number of farmers in compliance 
because 0 / ³ ¢ × = ¶ W ¶ G F q , and 0 / ³ ¢ × = ¶ W ¶ G F q . 
  However, the variance of payoffs should be taken into account for risk-averse 
farmers. The variance of the payoff from compliance (
c
i p ) is: 
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and the variance of the payoff from non-compliance is given by: 
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Equation (7) can be re-expressed as
13: 
2 2 2 2 2 ) ( F y p i nc
i q q s s
p - + = .                                            (8) 
The variance of the payoff from non-compliance is greater than from compliance 
since: 
0 ) ( ) ~ (
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 > - + - = - F y y p i i c
i
nc
i q q s s s
p p .                              (9) 
Because an increase in the variance of the payoff has a negative impact on expected 
utility, risk-averse farmers are more likely to comply with the scheme
14. Moral hazard 
becomes less problematic for risk-averse farmers under output price uncertainty.   
3.    The Compliance Reward Model 
We now extend the model to include compliance rewards. As indicated in the 
introduction, three possible sources of financing rewards are considered
15. Before 
analyzing the implications of each of these, a general framework for the compliance 
                                                
13  The derivation is in Appendix A. 
14  This result is consistent with the model developed by Fraser (2002). 
15  Money saved by reducing the initial payment level (cost share rate) could also be used. However, 
this increases the probability of non-participation and contract withdrawal discussed in section 2. A 
reduction in the initial level of payment is quite risky for the agri-environmental agency. Thus, we 
exclude this possibility.     8   
 
reward model is developed. The i
th farmer’s expected payoff under compliance and 
non-compliance is specified by: 
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and 
F y c p I E i i
e nc
i ) ( ) ( q q g p D - - - + = ,                                          (11) 
where R represents the compliance reward per farmer and  q D   is the difference 
between the initial and new objective probabilities of inspection. The latter term is 
introduced to reflect the option of reducing the inspection rate in order to conserve 
resources for the payment of rewards. The difference between the expected payoff 
from compliance and non-compliance is: 










i + D - + F - - = - q q p p .                            (12) 
If this difference is positive, the risk-neutral farmer will comply with the scheme. The 
compliance rate will be )) )( (( F R G + D - = W q q . Therefore, if the following condition 
is satisfied, the compliance rate among risk-neutral farmers is higher than before (with 
the pure penalty system): 
F R q q q D > D - ) ( .                                                (13) 
  Now let us consider the case when farmers are risk-averse. Again, we need to take 
account of the variance of payoffs to examine the effect of rewards on compliance. The 
variances of payoff from non-compliance and compliance are:
16 
2 2 2 2 2 )
~ ~
( F y p i nc
i q q s s
p - + =                                           (14) 
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or 
2 2 2 2 2 )
~ ~
( ~ R y p i c
i q q s s
p - + = ,                                        (16) 
where q q q D - =
~
. The sign of the difference between two variances, (14) and (16) is 
ambiguous. Given the size of penalty, the decision on compliance by the risk-averse 
farmer depends on the amount of the compliance reward per farmer.   
                                                
16  These variances are derived using the same procedure as in Appendix A.   9   
 
 
      Table 1: The amount of compliance reward per farmer and change in the inspection rate 
  
Source for compliance reward  Compliance reward per 
farmer 
Reduction in the 
inspection rate 
1  Funds obtained from reducing the 
inspection rate 
   
2  Fines collected in the previous period 
 
0 
3  Funds obtained by reducing the number 




Table 1 summarizes the compliance reward per farmer, R, and the reduction in the 
probability of inspection for each source. It is not difficult to derive results for a 
combination of financing sources. Details on the determination of the compliance 
reward are given in Appendix B. 
In the table, A represents the revenue collected from fines in the previous (initial) 
period,  ] 1 , 0 ( Î a   is the expected proportion of farmers that are in compliance 
(expected compliance rate)
17, and n is the number of farmers excluded from the 
scheme. 
To assess how compliance rewards might be used, we list the pros and cons 
associated with each source of funding. 
i) Money from reducing monitoring effort 
Decreasing the level of monitoring effort can increase the likelihood of 
compliance only if the cost of monitoring per farmer is sufficiently high. However, the 
new inspection rate has to be set a sufficiently high level to influence behaviour by 
risk-averse farmers to yield the desired environmental outcome. A large reduction in 
monitoring effort relative to the initial inspection rate
18  is likely to result in low 
compliance rates and unintended low environmental performance because the variance 
                                                
17  α  is assumed to be the same for the inspected group and the non-inspected group. 
18  The variance of the payoff from compliance depends on relative reductions in inspection rates rather 
than absolute reductions. It increases quadratically as the objective probability of inspection declines. In 
particular, over 80% reductions in the inspection rate results in a high variance of the payoff from 
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of the payoff from compliance will be high. This issue is examined through numerical 
analysis in the next section. 
ii) Proceeds obtained from fines 
Use of the revenue collected from fines can increase compliance rates for both 
risk-neutral and risk-averse farmers since it increases the expected payoff (utility) from 
compliance. However, a critical shortcoming of this approach is that if farmers comply, 
accumulated proceeds will run out at some point regardless of how these are 
distributed over time. The amount of fines collected involves an endogeneity problem 
– we need the revenue from fines to pay rewards, but the payment of rewards reduces 
the revenue obtained from fines. As a result, variability is introduced into the payment 
of rewards and this creates variability in compliance rates over time. Despite this 
weakness, wise use of this source of funding can increase compliance rates. This is 
explored further in subsequent numerical analysis. 
iii) Money saved by reducing the number of farmers enrolled 
Although stable high compliance rates can be achieved using this source of 
funding, lower total environmental performance can result if the agri-environmental 
agency cannot measure accurately the contribution of each farm to environmental 
quality. Producers whose participation in a scheme could potentially generate large 
environmental benefits may be excluded. Moreover, even if the agency can rank all 
applicants in terms of their potential contribution, use of this source of funding does 
not guarantee cost-effectiveness. The agri-environmental agency may exclude more 
farmers from the scheme than is necessary to achieve maximum compliance. This 
issue is also analyzed through numerical analysis. 
Thus far, we have focused on the case where the agri-environmental agency 
reallocates existing funds to finance compliance rewards. However, the revenue 
collected from fines and savings from reducing the number of farmers enrolled could 
also be allocated to increasing monitoring effort. In the rest of this section, we explore 
the trade-off between payments for compliance and monitoring effort and derive 
conditions that determine the preferred instrument.   
Let T be the total amount realized from budgetary savings (this could also relate 
to additional budgetary resources allocated to an agency). If the agri-environmental 
agency spends this amount to increase the inspection rate, the new probability of 
inspection,  q
~
  can be expressed as:   11   
 
N
v T / ~
+ =q q   ,                                                    (17) 
where the cost of monitoring per farmer is v . The difference between the expected 
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The compliance rate can be written as:  ) )) / ( (( F vN T G + = W q . If money is spent on 
compliance rewards, the expected payoff from compliance becomes: 
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and in this case, ) ) ) / ((( q a F N T G + = W . Therefore, if the following condition is 
satisfied, spending money on compliance rewards has a larger positive impact on the 
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  .                          (21) 
Since  a   lies between zero and one, if the cost of monitoring per farmer is greater 
than the size of the penalty, a compliance reward is the preferred instrument for 
risk-neutral farmers for a " , and vice versa.   
Again, for risk-averse farmers, it is necessary to compare the expected utility of 
these options. If money is spent to increase the inspection rate, the difference between 
the variance of payoffs from non-compliance and compliance can be written as: 
2 2 2 2 2 2 )
~ ~
( F y p i c
i
nc
i q q s s s
p p - + = - .                                    (22) 
When the agri-environmental agency spends money on compliance rewards, the 
difference between the two variances becomes: 
) )( (
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 R F y p i c
i
nc
i - - + = - q q s s s
p p .                            (23) 
The former (22) is larger than the latter (23). Hence, the risk-averse farmer has a 
greater incentive to comply with the scheme when monitoring effort is increased 
compared to the case where compliance rewards are provided. The larger the degree of 
risk aversion, the higher the threshold value for monitoring costs to make monitoring   12   
 
equally effective as the compliance reward. We examine the trade-off using numerical 
analysis. 
4.  Numerical Simulation 
This section provides the numerical analysis to illustrate some of the key findings in 
sections 2 and 3. It is assumed that the farmer’s utility function can be approximated 
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We employ the power utility function following Fraser (2002) so that constant relative 
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,  ) 1 , 0 [ Î d .                                            (26) 
Under these assumptions, we calculate values for the expected utility under each set of 
parameters. The hypothetical parameter values used are given in Table 2. 




               
100  100  80  30  0.5  1800  0.1  1500  0.7 
 
All parameter values are set so as to satisfy all inequalities discussed in previous 
sections (e.g., the participation constraint). Drawing on a report on monitoring 
methodologies in the Countryside Stewardship Scheme in U.K. (Little et al, 2001), we 
set the inspection rate 1 . 0 = q   and the cost share rate at 50%, which is typical in EQIP. 
Other parameters, which do not affect our principal conclusions, are determined 
arbitrarily. In addition, we assume that there are 100 farmers (N=100) whose net total 





i I B -   are generated from the normal distribution with mean, 1200 = m , 
and standard deviation, 50 = s . Applying the central limit theorem, we generate 
random values for 30 experiments to obtain mean values which are reasonable 
p y y ~ c g
e I q a F  13   
 
approximations to the true compliance rates. Following Fraser (2002), the coefficient 
of variation for the price of output is set at CV=0.2.   
Table 3 reports the impact of reductions in the inspection rate on the compliance 
rates when the cost of monitoring per farmer is higher than the size of penalty. For 
risk-neutral farmers, the larger the reduction in the probability of inspection, the higher 
the compliance rate. This is due to the fact that risk-neutral farmers do not care about 
an increase in the variance of the payoff from compliance. Meanwhile, the highest 
compliance rates (in bold type) can be achieved when reductions in inspection rates are 
70% ( 25 . 0 = d ), 60% ( 5 . 0 = d ), and 50% ( 75 . 0 = d ) for risk-averse farmers. As the 
degree of risk aversion increases the effect of changes in the variance of the payoff 
also increases. Since the attitude to risk is private information for farmers, over 70% 
reduction is quite risky for the agri-environmental agency. 
Table 3: Reductions in monitoring effort and compliance rates 
              Compliance rate (%) 
Reduction in the 




  Risk neutral    δ=0.25    δ=0.5    δ=0.75 
0    0    16    32    50    70 
10    2000    24    41    60    78 
20    4000    33    51    69    84 
30    6000    42    60    77    88 
40    8000    52    69    82    91 
50    10000    62    76    86    92 
60    12000    73    81    87    91 
70    14000    81    83    85    86 
80    16000    87    79    68    56 
90     18000     92     44     5     0 
The cost of monitoring: k =2000 
 
To examine the impact of changes in the initial inspection rate
19, table 4 gives the 
results when 08 . 0 = q . The impact of changes in the degree of risk aversion on 
compliance rates are similar to the case where 1 . 0 = q . This implies that the relative 
magnitude of reductions in the inspection rate is important, rather than the absolute 
reduction. 
                                                
19  The initial budgetary resources also change.   14   
 
 
Table 4: Effect of reductions in monitoring effort on compliance rates with an initial inspection rate of 
θ= 0.08 
              Compliance rates (%) 
Reduction in the 




  Risk 
neutral    δ=0.25    δ=0.5    δ=0.75 
0    0    5    13    28    46 
10    1600    8    19    34    53 
20    3200    12    25    42    60 
30    4800    17    31    49    66 
40    6400    23    38    54    71 
50    8000    30    44    60    72 
60    9600    38    50    61    71 
70    11200    46    52    57    63 
80    12800    55    48    41    34 
90     14400     64     20     3     0 
The cost of monitoring: k =2000 
       
Table 5 shows the effects of using the revenue collected from fines on 
compliance rates over time for risk-neutral and risk-averse farmers. The use of this 
source can increase compliance rates. As indicated in section 3, however, if the 
revenue obtained from fines is spent on compliance rewards in a single period, 
compliance rates are unstable over time. Distributing collected fines over time can 
stabilize compliance rates (in this case over three periods), but only a rate of 54% can 
be achieved. Nevertheless, wise use of this source could be complementary to other 
sources of funding. For instance, a combination of funding sources for compliance 
rewards (e.g., reducing monitoring effort plus fines) will result in a better outcome.   15   
 
       
Table 5: Effects of the use of funds collected from fines on the compliance rate over time   
     Compliance rate (%) 
    Spent at once    Distributed over 
three periods   
Distributed over three periods 
with reduction in monitoring 
effort 
Time    Risk 
Neutral  δ=0.25    Risk 
Neutral 
δ=0.2
5    Risk 
Neutral  δ=0.25 
0    16   32     16   32     73   81  
1    99   100     54   74     78   85  
2    16   32     54   74     78   85  
3    99   100     54   74     78   85  
4    16   32     16   32     73   81  
5    99   100     54   74     78   85  
6    16   32     54   74     78   85  
7    99   100     54   74     78   85  
                   
    Unstable    Short, sharp, shock 
(relatively stable)    Higher and more stable  
                             




           
 
Table 6 summarizes the impact of using savings from limiting enrolment in the 
scheme on compliance rates. These increase dramatically for both risk-neutral and 
risk-averse farmers. However, over exclusion of farmers from the scheme leads to a 
lower total number of farmers in compliance. In our numerical example, when the 
Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is 0.5, the most efficient exclusion level 
is eight farmers (eight percent of eligible farmers, if these results are interpreted in 
terms of percentages). Although compliance rates (99%) are not 100%, the number of 
farmers in compliance is the highest (91). The agri-environmental agency needs to 
choose carefully the number of farmers enrolled in a scheme, paying attention to 




Table 6: The effects of reductions in the number of farmers enrolled in the scheme on the number of 
farmers in compliance 
          Number of farms in compliance (compliance rate (%)) 
Number of 




  Risk 
neutral    δ=0.25     δ=0.5     δ=0.75 
0    0    16 (16)    32 (32)    50 (50)    70 (70) 
2    1800    32 (33)    50 (51)    69 (70)    83 (85) 
4    3600    50 (52)    67 (70)    83 (86)    91 (95) 
6    5400    69 (73)    82 (87)    89 (95)    92 (98) 
8    7200    81 (88)    88 (96)    91 (99)    92 (100) 
10    9000    87 (97)    89 (99)    90 
(100)    90 (100) 
12     10800     87 (99)     88 (100)     88 
(100)     88 (100) 
 
  Table 7 shows compliance rates for different costs of monitoring
20  monitoring 
effort and compliance rewards when additional budgetary resources or budgetary 
savings are available ( 4500 = T ). Since 1050 1500 * 7 . 0 = = F a , compliance rates are 
the same for both instruments for risk-neutral farmers if the cost of monitoring is 1050. 
If the cost of monitoring is greater than 1050, a compliance reward is the preferred 
instrument, and vice versa. For risk-averse farmers, however, the threshold value for 
the cost of monitoring which equates compliance rates for the two instruments is 
higher than 1050. For instance, when the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion 
is 0.25, monitoring and compliance rewards are equally efficient instruments (same 
compliance rate of 78 %). In our numerical example, we set 7 . 0 = a , but the 
agri-environmental agency should carefully determine its budget allocation since the 
expected proportion of farmers in compliance is private information. At any rate, if the 
cost of monitoring is expected to be much higher than the possible size of penalty, it is 
more efficient to devote money to compliance rewards. 
                                                
20  Again, different monitoring costs imply different levels of the initial budgetary resources since the 
probability of inspection is fixed. Although we can also change the probability of inspection to 
correspond to the level of monitoring cost, this does not affect our key findings.   17   
 
 
Table 7: Monitoring versus compliance rewards for different costs of monitoring 
   Compliance rate (%) 
  
  Risk neutral    δ=0.25    δ=0.5    δ=0.75 
Cost of monitoring    M    CR    M    CR    M    CR    M    CR 
1000    62    60    81    78    92    90    97    96 
1050    60    60    79    78    91    90    97    96 
1100    58    60    78    78    90    90    97    96 
1150    56    60    76    78    89    90    96    96 
1200    53    60    74    78    88    90    96    96 
1250    52    60    73    78    87    90    95    96 
M: spending funds in increasing the inspection rate; CR: spending funds in financing compliance rewards; T=4500 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper investigates the potential use of compliance rewards in agri-environmental 
schemes and examines trade-offs among possible sources for funding these under 
asymmetric information and output price uncertainty. Under the assumption of 
heterogeneous net compliance costs, theoretical models are developed and numerical 
analysis is conducted. 
      We find that whether compliance rates can be increased by reducing monitoring 
effort to finance compliance rewards depends on the level of monitoring costs. If the 
cost of monitoring is high, compliance rewards financed by reducing monitoring effort, 
can increase the likelihood of compliance for both risk-neutral and risk-averse farmers. 
However, if monitoring effort is reduced substantially, the variance of the payoff from 
compliance will be high and low compliance rates will result for risk-averse farmers. 
The revenue collected from fines can be used with other sources of financing for 
compliance rewards. Funding by reducing the number of farmers enrolled in the 
scheme will be effective only if the agri-environmental agency can measure the 
contribution of each farm to environmental quality accurately.   
      We also examine the trade-off between instruments (monitoring or compliance 
rewards) when extra budget and/or budgetary savings are available. We find that the   18   
 
preferred choice of instrument depends on the level of monitoring costs. Higher risk 
aversion among farmers leads to higher threshold values for monitoring costs which 
equalizes compliance rates for the two instruments. 
      In conclusion, under certain conditions the use of a compliance reward can mitigate 
the problem of moral hazard in agri-environmental programmes. In particular, if there 
are constraints on the size of penalties that can be imposed, and/or the monitoring cost 
per farm is high, the compliance reward is a preferred instrument. In addition, the 
agri-environmental agency needs to allocate limited budgetary resources between 
initial payments and enforcement efforts efficiently. In the light of these results it is 
clear that further consideration of the design and implementation of incentive-based 
agri-environmental schemes is merited.   19   
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A.  Deriving the variance of the payoff   
The variance of the payoff from compliance (6) can be rewritten as: 
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      (7-A) 
where  0 ) ( ) ( = ∫ Q -
p
p d p p   and  1 ) ( = ∫ Q
p
p d . Therefore, (7-A) can be rewritten as: 
2 2 2 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( F y p i q q s q - + - .                                          (7-B) 
Similarly, the second term is given by: 
2 2 2 2 ) 1 ( F y p i q q s q - + .                                            (7-C) 
From (7-B) and (7-C) we obtain: 
2 2 2 2 2 2 ] ) 1 ( ) 1 [( F y p i nc
i q q q q s s
p - + - + = .                              (7-D) 
Rearranging this equation yields equation (8). 
 
B.  Determining the amount of compliance reward per farmer 
The amount of (expected) compliance reward per farmer is dependent on the expected 
proportion of farmers in compliance (expected compliance rates),a , the objective 
probability of inspection,  q , and the total number of farmers in the scheme, N. 
Because the farmer can only receive a compliance reward if inspected, the amount of 
the (expected) compliance reward per farmer should be determined by dividing total 
funding available for compliance rewards, T , by the expected number of those who are 
in cell A in the table below. 
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    θ (inspected)    1-θ (not-inspected) 
α(compliance)  A    B 
1-α(non-compliance)  C    D 
 
Thus, the amount of (expected) compliance reward per farmer is given by: 
N
T
R
qa
= . 
 